Posts Tagged Dartmouth

A Response to President Obama’s Call For Good Ideas

On Wednesday night, President Obama called for ideas to improve the proposals in Congress to reform healthcare. Taking him at his word, I propose the following for healthcare (not simply health insurance) reform.

My Foundational Premises:

Let me first state the two critical foundational premises that inform my proposals.

First, I don’t think that personal health records or electronic medical records will bring any cost savings to the system. I note that some of President Obama’s advisors agree. In any event, absent 100% inter-operability, PHRs and EMRs will always hit the “End of the Line”, to quote the Traveling Wilburys, most likely when a physician is in urgent need of the information. The only entity in the U.S. that can guarantee anything approximating 100% deployment is the Federal government, the most obvious example of which is the Social Security account.

Second, I think the HSA concept is a good one. Consumerism pervades every aspect of the American economy except for those health care services for which Medicare has established a fee. In contrast, consider how Americans shop for plastic surgery, cosmeceuticals, alternative therapies, and organic foods. I believe that training consumers to make unique value decisions in health care purchases is a good and necessary idea. Even when the tax-deductibility of employer-sponsored health benefits inevitably crumbles (the only real way to pay for reform), I think a tax-advantaged Health Savings Account is good policy.

My Plan:

I know that a good political plan should be summarized in three points, but healthcare merits a few more. Hence, the following eleven points represent a direction that the Federal government could take that would at once be palatable to a majority of working Americans, reap long-term cost-savings and other benefits such as allowing Americans to retain decision-making power over personal healthcare decisions and immediately incentivize the healthcare financing and delivery system to deliver far more value for the money.

  1. Couple the issuance of a Social Security card to newborns with a tax-advantaged HSA and a PHR.
  2. Similar to Senator Kerry’s proposal in the 2004 Presidential election, purchase a 25-year term catastrophic insurance policy for the child at birth.
  3. Deposit $2,000 per year into the HSA for preventive care.
  4. Marry SCHIP reform/expansion with those HSAs to deliver preventive care, specifically to incorporate CDC guidelines. Between preventive care and catastrophic coverage, we can cover the vast majority of every child’s healthcare needs.
  5. At age 18, allow the child to convert the balance of the HSA into a 529 account for college expenses.
  6. At age 24, “sweep” the balance of the account, if any, into the now-adult’s Social Security account and purchase a new 40-year catastrophic policy.
  7. For adults, a call for personal responsibility is critical – the healthcare delivery system is only 10% of the issue, while behavior and genetics are each more than 30%. For the 30%+ that is behavioral, ERISA should be amended to allow employers flexibility to provide incentives, but not penalties, for improved health behaviors. For the 10% that is related to healthcare purchasing, knowledge is power, and price/cost transparency is necessary to allow consumers to evaluate the value of the care that they need.
  8. The hardest issue, but perhaps most crucial, is the need to address the employer-sponsored tax benefit in a rational fashion so that the consumer/patient is incented to control the costs. The most likely positive unintended consequence of reform is the behavioral change that price/cost transparency would bring.
  9. Repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is essential to health insurance reform. It is widely cited that Medicare’s administrative costs are lower than those of commercial insurers. CMS obviously has the benefits of scale that allow a lower administrative cost as a percentage of dollars paid. The critical fact in comparing CMS to United or Aetna or Wellpoint is that CMS does not have to follow state insurance regulations, which allows it to administer a global budget with one adminstrative team. In contrast, insurers with multi-state operations have tremendous duplication of the same essential function, which is required to comply with differing state requirements. It may seem counter-intuitive to Republicans to federalize the oversight of the insurance industry to eliminate the barriers presented by state-to-state regulation. In a sense, it is a restriction of state authority; in another sense, it is deregulation. Wise regulation can level the playing field across states for private players to compete at an administrative cost level with each other and with CMS.
  10. Address the issue or pre-existing conditions.  Whereas the President seems to believe his version of the reforms will make them a non-issue, Republicans must address this one issue that resonates with most tax payers. If federal oversight is in place, and barriers to interstate competition lowered, wider risk pools will be available to the average consumer, thereby spreading the coverage cost over a larger base. In any event, pre-existing conditions cannot be allowed to prevent Americans from obtaining affordable insurance coverage.
  11. To date, Washington has focused almost no attention on the healthcare delivery side, which is the most complicated aspect. For starters, carefully analyze the 747 hospitals celebrated by The Hospital Value Index™, which should rightfully be the models of healthcare delivery reform, not just Mayo, the Cleveland Clinic and Intermountain. These examples routinely cited by the White House as models of reform cannot be replicated, mostly because they are geographic or demographic outliers. There are literally hundreds of hospitals delivering great value — go find them, find their commonalities, and start there.

A few concluding thoughts:

The White House, and particularly Peter Orszag at the OMB, are fixated on Dartmouth Atlas, which uses 2005 Medicare data as a prescription for reform. As we have demonstrated in our analysis, a “GPS” approach that evaluates the most recent all-payer data is much more insightful than an Atlas.

Elements of this plan do not provide immediate coverage for all uninsured, but it could be adapted to “grandfather” in every person in the U.S. who is under 18 at the effective date of the plan. It would, however, provide a much more targeted program than SCHIP, presumably at a lower cost. My belief is that the combination of a distinctly Democratic concept (Social Security) and an equally distinctly Republican concept (HSA) would allow a truly bipartisan solution.

I keep waiting for a call for shared sacrifice from Washington; instead, all of the bills or proposals shelter labor from any sacrifice in insurance reform. Health reform for all must mean ALL, not everyone except organized labor. As George Will suggests, we will all be much better off when 7% of the workforce stops making all the rules.

All of this requires more thought and discussion, but I think it is fairly reasonable.

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Lost in D.C. with The Dartmouth Atlas

by Hal Andrews & John Morrow

We know some of the people involved in the Dartmouth Atlas Project, and we think their analysis is important. Even so, using 2005 Medicare data to inform comprehensive payment reform is inadequate.

As such, we are surprised and dismayed at how policymakers are using the findings as the map for healthcare reform in Washington, D.C. We are also frankly appalled at how The New Yorker article by Dr. Atul Gawande has seemingly become the guidepost of reform for policymakers. The reason is that the conclusions that The White House and much of Congress have drawn from The New Yorker article are, at best, suspect and, at worst, completely wrong. Reengineering 20% of the economy is a large task, in our view, and getting the facts straight is important.

So, what have we done? Instead of using an “Atlas” to analyze McAllen and El Paso, we suggest using a “GPS” to triangulate the position that hospitals played in overall excess cost and utilization. Doing so provides some critical facts that The New Yorker failed to report.

At first blush, McAllen and El Paso are quite similar:

  • 2008 populations are within 1% (752,020 for McAllen vs. 759,868 for El Paso).
  • Median age of the population is similar, at 28.2 years for McAllen compared to 30.6 years for El Paso.
  • Per capita income for each market is depressingly low, with $12,276 for McAllen and $16,838 for El Paso (making El Paso 37% wealthier, as suggested by the physicians in McAllen).
  • Medicare hospital utilization rates are similar, with 28% Medicare utilization in McAllen and 30% Medicare utilization in El Paso.
  • Total hospital utilization (i.e., all-payer data) when compared to the population were similar in calendar year 2007 (the most current year that all payer data are available), with 12% hospital utilization in McAllen versus 10% hospital utilization in El Paso.
  • Each market has 2% workers’ compensation hospital utilization.
  • Per capita hospital utilization is similar, with a rate of .48 patient days per capita in El Paso compared to .53 patient days per capita for McAllen.
  • McAllen cost per case is 5.4% lower than El Paso, and McAllen’s average length of stay is 9.6% lower than El Paso.

Based on these similarities, McAllen is in many ways a more desirable option for hospital care.

So, what about the real differences between McAllen and El Paso?

Overall, and not just for the Medicare and Medicaid population data (which were central to the Atlas and The New Yorker perspective), McAllen’s average cost per case is $315.00 less than in El Paso, representing in total $23.6 million in incremental costs that could be saved if all of the El Paso cases had been treated in McAllen hospitals. For policymakers who are concerned about the price paid by the uninsured, the average charge per case is $7,841 more in El Paso than in McAllen.

Importantly, the “excessive” costs attributed to McAllen do not occur in McAllen, or even in Hidalgo County. A full 6% of McAllen residents left McAllen for care to other markets such as Brownsville, Houston, San Antonio, Corpus Christi and Dallas! A total of $283 million in charges migrated away from McAllen, yet those costs are attributed to the population and demographics of the beneficiaries living there.  As a result, the Dartmouth Atlas analysis overestimates the costs attributed to McAllen. As a comparison, $63 million of charges out-migrated from El Paso to other Texas hospitals during the same period (the all-payer analysis does not reveal out-migration to any other states; El Paso is closer to Phoenix than Dallas).

What about the important things, like quality? The March 2009 release of the Hospital Value Index™ reports McAllen’s average index score at 42.76 with El Paso’s being 43.83, just over one basis point difference. This indicates that the markets are nominally different on quality, core process measures, mortality, patient safety and patient satisfaction and experience. Shorter lengths of stay, lower costs, and lower mark-ups for charges on patient bills make for a more desirable profile of McAllen hospitals than El Paso.

In summary, the most current all-payer data (2007) simply do not support The New Yorker piece, which was partially based on 2005 Medicare data from The Dartmouth Atlas. For both McAllen and El Paso, the cost per beneficiary would decrease if the beneficiaries did not leave the market.

These markets have a great deal in common, but critical differences are not discussed in The New Yorker. We are reminded how important it is to “follow the money”, yet without the anecdotes about what is going on in McAllen, the empirical data report that the hospitals in McAllen aren’t the problem.

We think that there are several important questions that arise:

  • Could an entire industry be led astray by the miscalculations of Medicare spending delivered by a half dozen hospitals in McAllen and El Paso?
  • Should policymakers draft legislation to reform the provision and coverage of healthcare based solely on (old) Medicare data?
  • Is the nation going to allow a handful of well-meaning, but uninformed, policy-makers to reform healthcare based on the view of an article in The New Yorker?

Heaven help us if we do…

Hospital Inpatient Care        
McAllen Residents

Cases

Patient Days

Patient Charges

Hospital Costs

Stayed In County for Care

85,417

349,215

$2,315,742,163

$467,429,802

Left County For Care

6,069

53,153

$282,687,694

$101,905,182

Total

91,486

402,368

$2,598,429,858

$569,334,984

 

 

 

 

 

McAllen Residents

Avg. Charge/Case

Avg. Charge/Day

Avg. Cost/Case

Avg. Cost/Day

Stayed In County for Care

$27,111

$6,631

$5,472

$1,339

Left County For Care

$46,579

$5,318

$16,791

$1,917

All

$28,402

$6,458

$6,223

$1,415

 

 

 

 

 

El Paso Residents

Cases

Patient Days

Patient Charges

Hospital Costs

Stayed In County for Care

74,895

351,704

$2,617,700,997

$433,484,831

Left County For Care

888

13,748

$63,441,348

$20,851,930

Total

75,783

365,452

$2,681,142,346

$454,336,761

         
El Paso Residents

Avg. Charge/Case

Avg. Charge/Day

Avg. Cost/Case

Avg. Cost/Day

Stayed In County for Care

$34,952

$7,443

$5,788

$1,233

Left County For Care

$71,443

$4,615

$23,482

$1,517

All

$35,379

$7,337

$5,995

$1,243

(Source: Texas Health Care Information Collection, TX Public Use Data File, State Hospital Data, Calendar Year 2007)

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A Critique of The New Yorker’s Health Care Plan

If you have not read “The Cost Conundrum” by Atul Gawande in The New Yorker, you should, because the The Washington Post and The New York Times have suggested it is required reading in the White House these days. Based on those accounts, the article is further evidence of the Dartmouth Atlas proposition that over-utilization is the crucial issue in health care reform. Putting aside the fact that comparing McAllen to El Paso is like comparing Newton to Wellesley, two things jump out from the article that I believe bear further consideration.

First, as we know in every aspect of our lives, human beings respond to economic incentives. In the past decade, no other profession in America has suffered a decline in inflation-adjusted income like physicians. It is curious that we trust physicians to be smart enough to heal us but assume that they will not attempt to stymie consistent actual and threatened reductions in their income.

Second, in what is increasingly troubling in my view, the Dartmouth Atlas analysis is becoming the blunt instrument of health care reform policies. Assuming that Dr. Gawande believes over-utilization is the crux of the problem, it is also curious that he did not call out the obvious fix to the real issue in McAllen, which is to eliminate physician investments in hospitals, surgery centers and in-office ancillary services. If overutilization is the diagnosis, Stark III is the cure.

In fairness to the Dartmouth research, the fact that Medicare utilization varies widely in the country is undoubtedly true. The corollary that has now become accepted fact in the media is that less is more and better quality. I’m not sure the data supports that.

The Mayo, McAllen and El Paso Market Analysis shows a series of slides for St. Mary’s in Rochester (Mayo), two hospitals in McAllen, and two hospitals in El Paso. One is my favorite – the Discharge Destination by Day of the Week. In plain English, this slide depicts where patients go when they are discharged from the hospital. The other slides show the cost and the charge of certain procedures in Rochester, McAllen and El Paso. I will let you draw your own conclusions, but I bet you will struggle to understand why Mayo is a better choice for Medicare patients than the hospitals in McAllen and El Paso. You might also wonder why Mayo costs so much more on a per unit basis than hospitals in McAllen and El Paso.

Importantly, the Senate Finance Committee plans to benchmark all hospitals in its Value-Based Purchasing initiative. We have modeled how that turns out for Mayo and others being touted as the health systems to emulate, and it does not end like you might think.

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